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What Should Remain of the Critical 
 Approaches to International Law?
International Legal Theory as Critique 
by Tilmann Altwicker1 & Oliver Diggelmann2
The article explores what should remain of the ‘critical approaches’ to international law. The 
notion ‘critical approaches’ is used as an umbrella term and refers to a bundle of loosely re-
lated approaches including the ‘new approaches to international law’ (NAIL) or ‘newstream’, 
the ‘Third World Approaches to International Law’ (TWAIL) and the ‘feminist approaches’. 
The article argues that their common denominator is a specific project of ‘critique’. The aim 
of ‘critique’ is to identify underlying structures and fundamental shortcomings of interna-
tional law and to assess the rational potential of the international legal order. The article 
sheds light on the ‘critical toolkit’ and international law’s biases, as a key topic of critique. It 
identifies three candidates for the role of enduring contributions to the discipline: the claim 
for context sensitive doctrinal work, the analysis of the ambivalent roles of seemingly ‘pro-
gressive’ discourses, such as, e.g., those on human rights and on ‘international law and de-
mocracy’, and the insights of critique into the role of subjectivity in the work of international 
lawyers. The article comes to the conclusion that most contemporary strands in international 
legal theory underestimate this ‘critical heritage’.
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I. Introduction: What Makes A Critical Approach?
Approaches associated with ‘critical international law’ (CIL) are often regarded 
as a kind of ‘younger sister’ of critical legal studies (CLS). The best days of 
CLS are long gone, CLS was even famously declared ‘dead’ by Duncan Ken-
nedy, one of the major figures of the critical legal studies movement.3 This 
raises the question whether or to which extent CIL is present in the current in-
ternational legal discourse or whether it shares the same fate as CLS. Even if 
one does not follow Kennedy’s apodictic view and considers CLS ‘alive’ in the 
sense that its agenda has – at least partly – been mainstreamed,4 the implica-
tions of the demise of CLS for the role of CIL remain unclear. Opinions about 
the current role and significance of CIL vary within the discipline of interna-
tional legal theory. Some consider the critical approaches irrelevant. To support 
their view, they point to the relatively few citations of critical authors by inter-
national tribunals.5 This opinion derives its plausibility mainly from the fact 
that theory-skeptical positivism is still (and always was) dominant during the 
last decades, and that the reputation of an international lawyer does not depend 
on whether he or she pays particular attention to international legal theory.6 
Others would argue contrarily. As a matter of fact, vast literature has been writ-
ten in the name of NAIL, TWAIL or international feminism in the last decades. 
CIL triggered fierce debates and provoked strong resistance.7 It is worth men-
tioning in this context that some critical authors have become – not without 
unintended self-irony – part of the discipline’s establishment. Networks among 
CIL-authors are a power factor within the discipline. Proponents such as David 
3 The remark stems from a workshop at Yale, see Robert C. Ellickson, Trends in Legal Scholarship: 
A Statistical Study, 29 Journal of Legal Studies (2000), p. 517, 525. CLS is regarded by many as 
either entirely irrelevant or simply devastating to orthodox legal thinking because of the purity of its 
negativism, see Motoaki Funakoshi, Taking Duncan Kennedy Seriously: Ironical Liberal Legalism, 
15 Widener Law Review (2009), p. 231, 232.
4 Mark Tushnet, another prominent CLS author, pointed to the role of CLS in contemporary legal 
thinking and argued that central insights of CLS have become ‘the common sense of the legal aca-
demy, see Mark Tushnet, Survey Article: Critical Legal Theory (without Modifiers) in the United 
States, 13 Journal of Political Philosophy (2005), p. 99, 100. 
5 The search engine of the International Court of Justice shows no citation of eminent TWAIL authors 
such as Antony Anghie and Bhupinder S. Chimni or of feminist protagonists such as Hilary 
Charlesworth or Shelley Wright. The document search for ‘Koskenniemi’ shows 35 results (by Oc-
tober 10, 2013).
6 A remarkable denouncement of ‘theory’ was formulated by Brownlie who compared ‘theory’ with 
‘a bank of fog on a still day’, see Ian Brownlie, Recognition in Theory and Practice, in: Ronald St. 
J. Macdonald & Douglas M. Johnston (eds.), The Structure and Process of International Law, The 
Hague 1983, p. 197, 197.
7 Duncan Kennedy & Karl E. Klare, A Bibliography of Critical Legal Studies, 94 Yale Law Journal 
(1984), 461.
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Kennedy and Martti Koskenniemi have actively and successfully sought to cre-
ate such networks.8 
The article addresses the question what ideas or concepts of CIL should re-
main in the discourse on international legal theory. We argue that it is its spe-
cific project of ‘critique’ and some practical insights gained by it that should be 
preserved. Understood as ‘critique’, the critical project must be considered to 
have continuing relevance for problem-conscious doctrinal analysis, assessing 
‘progressive discourses’ and for a realistic self-perception of lawyers. 
The article proceeds as follows: In the introductory remarks (I.), we address 
the question of what makes a theoretical approach to international law a ‘criti-
cal’ approach. We argue that it is the element of ‘critique’ which is central. The 
second part (II.) considers how ‘critique’ of international law looks like in prac-
tice. What are the conceptual ‘tools’ and methodological parameters it employs? 
How does CIL seek to accomplish its normative mission? The third part (III.) 
isolates three ideas or insights which we consider candidates for the role of en-
during contributions to the discipline. We conclude on a critical note (IV.) by 
arguing that most currently prominent approaches to international law underes-
timate the ‘critical heritage’ as envisaged by this article.
A. Project: Critique of International Law
What makes an approach to international law a ‘critical approach’? There are 
three ways to answer the question. First, one may regard an approach ‘critical’ if 
it has its intellectual roots in the critical legal studies movement. Most CIL-lit-
erature is in one way or another ‘critical’ in this sense by taking up CLS topics 
and concepts and by adapting them to the international context. For example, 
CIL criticizes ‘mainstream scholarship’ in familiar CLS style for unduly reduc-
ing problems of law and government to questions of doctrinal problem solving.9 
Second, one may associate the notion ‘critical’ with the leftist agenda for change 
in favor of the disadvantaged. Such an understanding of ‘critical’ is material or 
justice-oriented. In most ‘newstream’, TWAIL and feminist literature, a ‘critical 
spirit’ in this sense or ‘empowerment ambition’ is at work. David Kennedy, an 
early and particularly influential voice associating with CIL, writes: ‘We must 
8 David Kennedy, When Renewal Repeats: Thinking Against the Box, 32 NYU Journal of Internatio-
nal Law and Politics (2000), p. 335, 476–500; David M. Trubek, Looking Back and to the Left: 
From the Bremen Conference to the Present, 12 German Law Journal (2011), p. 28, 32–33.
9 Bhupinder S. Chimni, An Outline of a Marxist Course on Public International Law, in: Susan 
Marks (ed.), International Law on the Left: Re-examining Marxist Legacies, Cambridge 2008, p. 53, 
53–54.
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grasp the depth of the injustice of the world today and the urgency of change’.10 
Finally, one may understand ‘critical’ as referring to a specific understanding of 
‘critique’. ‘Critique’ in this sense means the reflection on the potential and lim-
its of reason in the discourse on international law. ‘Critique’ can be distin-
guished from ‘criticism’. ‘Critique’ is, first of all, a particularly scholarly 
agency, while ‘criticism’ denotes the result of a process of evaluation. More 
importantly, ‘critique’ is more ambitious, more fundamental than mere ‘criti-
cism’. Being ‘critical’ in the sense of CIL implies the will to ‘unveil’ what is 
‘really’ going on in the international legal sphere, to expose the inherent short-
comings of international law and, in some instances, outline the path for ‘new’ 
international law responding to the critique. This understanding of ‘critical’ is – 
remotely – related to the ‘Kantian tradition’ that is committed to explore the 
potential and limits of reason.11 CIL – as a bundle of projects of ‘critique’ in this 
sense – analyzes ‘deep structures’ of international law, to employ Noam Chom-
sky’s term, which made its career also in international legal scholarship.12 
It seeks to unveil the premises on which judicial and scholarly arguments are 
based and explores the potential for change. CIL-authors are willing to take the 
risk that the foundations of daily legal work become insecure. This risk which 
non-critical approaches avoid is necessary to understand the spirit of CIL. CIL 
is based on the strong belief in the power and potential of critique. In our view, 
this spirit is essential for the critical project.13 Martti Koskenniemi describes his 
undertaking in ‘From Apology to Utopia’ as a ‘formal-structural analysis of the 
“conditions of possibility” of international law as an argumentative practice.’14 
The crucial term is ‘conditions of possibility’. It implies the ambition to shed 
light on the fundamental premises of the legal order and reminds – tellingly – of 
Kantian semantics. We consider the project of critique to be the best description 
for a common denominator of CIL. 
10 David Kennedy, Preface, in: José Maria Beneyto & David Kennedy (eds.), New Approaches to In-
ternational Law: The European and the American Experiences, The Hague 2012, p. IX.
11 See Otfried Höffe, Immanuel Kant, Marshall Farrier transl., Albany 1994, pp. 33–34. See also 
Jason E. Whitehead, From Criticism to Critique: Preserving the Radical Potential of Critical Legal 
Studies Through a Reexamination of Frankfurt School Critical Theory, 26 Florida State University 
Law Review (1999), p. 701, at n. 1. Kant used the term ‘critique’ primarily in the context of his a 
priori theory of knowledge and action. 
12 The term ‘deep structure’ originally stems from linguistic theory. It has found its way into interna-
tional legal theory though the work of CLS author Roberto Mangabeira Unger. See in particular 
Roberto M. Unger, Knowledge and Politics, New York 1984, p. 8.
13 See, mutatis mutandis, Whitehead, supra note 11, p. 701.
14 Martti Koskenniemi, The Gentle Civilizer of Nations, The Rise and Fall of International Law 1870-
1960, Cambridge 2002, p. 1. Koskenniemi rejects to be ‘labeled’, his work is commonly associated 
with the critical legal studies movement though, see Rein Müllerson, The Gentle Civilizer of Na-
tions, 13 European Journal of International Law (2002), p. 727, 732. 
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The bundle of approaches we label as ‘critical approaches’ is highly hetero-
geneous. The ‘new approaches to international law’ (NAIL) or ‘newstream’,15 
the ‘Third World Approaches to International Law’ (TWAIL)16 and the ‘femi-
nist approaches’17 are loosely united in the sense that they are all on a ‘mission’ 
to decipher fundamental endemic shortcomings of the international legal order 
and to ask about alternative paths. They do not work with the same premises 
though. The critical international legal movement comprises a rich variety of 
strands which are in some cases hardly reconcilable or even incompatible. For 
example, those strands of feminism which advocate equal rights for women and 
men have a completely different focus than, for example, ‘critique of rights’- 
femi nism has.18 Rather, the latter criticizes the preoccupation of the first with 
rights, which it considers narrow-minded and insensitive to other and more con-
structive forms of social problem-solving. As a solution, it suggests working 
towards the establishment of a different culture which is more sensitive to the 
situation and needs of women. We do not intend to downplay these and other 
differences among the various approaches coming under the label of CIL. Our 
focus is on what unites the strands, i.e., the project of critique, and on what 
should remain as their enduring contribution. 
B. Critique as Legal Science:  
Analytical and Normative Dimension of CIL
The ‘critical project’ has two dimensions. It has a descriptive-analytical and a 
normative dimension.19 ‘Critique’ of international law is, first of all, an analyti-
cal project. It is about understanding what is ‘really’ going on in the interna-
tional legal sphere, and it typically employs a specific analytical ‘toolkit’ for 
this analysis. We will discuss this ‘toolkit’ in some detail in section II.A. It suf-
fices to mention that CIL is concerned with understanding the ‘operating mode’ 
of international law. For this, CIL does not rely on simple doctrinal analysis in 
15 Influential ‘newstream’ authors include, i.a., David Kennedy, the early Martti Koskenniemi, Philip 
Allott, Tony Carty, Jan Klabbers, Thomas Skouteris, Lauri Mälksoo. 
16 Influential authors are, i.a., R.P. Anand, Mohammed Bedjaoui, Bhupinder S. Chimni, Antony Angie, 
Makau Mutua, Balakrishnan Rajagopal, James T. Gathii, Yasuaki Onuma. 
17 Influential representatives i.a.: Hilary Charlesworth, Christine Chinkin, Shelley Wright, Karen 
Knop, Anne Orford, Diane Otto. 
18 For a survey of the several strands of thought within feminism see Hilary Charlesworth & Chris-
tine Chinkin, The Boundaries of International Law: A feminist Analysis, Manchester 2000, pp. 38 ff.
19 Recently, Anne Peters has suggested distinguishing not only an analytical and a normative dimen-
sion of legal scholarship, but a doctrinal, an empirical, a theoretical, and an ethical dimension Anne 
Peters, Realizing Utopia as a Scholarly Endeavour, 24 European Journal of International Law 
(2013), p. 533, 545–549.
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the sense of ‘logical semantic analysis’.20 Rather, its analytical quest for under-
standing the ‘operating mode’ of international law draws from insights of soci-
ology, linguistics, economic theory, political philosophy, psychology, and social 
anthropology. CIL incorporates new perspectives on law that enable unveiling 
blind spots, inconsistencies, and biases in the discipline of international law. 
Typical critical research uncovers implicit assumptions underlying mainstream 
doctrine. It tries to show that doctrine often is under-theorized and that it, in 
some cases, allows for arbitrary results. 
The normative dimension is the ‘natural companion’ to the analytical ele-
ment of critical thinking.21 Here, a specific idea of justice is used as a yardstick 
for measuring positive international law. In such a setting, the normative con-
ception provides both the analytical perspective and, normatively, the direction 
of possible solutions. TWAIL author Bhupinder S. Chimni’s work provides an 
example. He states that the task of the international lawyer is ‘nothing short of 
the peaceful transformation of the global relations of production, consumption 
and distribution.’22 The ‘alienation of international law from the poor’, Chimni 
argues, should be overcome and be replaced by ‘ethical forms of global societal 
relations’.23 Feminist authors often argue in an analogous manner. Some of 
them describe their project as the scientific response to the political goals of 
feminist struggles.24 The significance of the normative dimension varies in 
CIL. In some critical works it appears rather peripheral compared to the analyt-
ical part. Martti Koskenniemi’s claim for a socially conscious ‘relatedness’ of 
the international lawyer to the world is a good example.25 It is a corollary to his 
analytical findings that international law lacks objectivity and impartiality. Ko-
skenniemi describes his normative dimension explicitly as ‘normativity in the 
small’.26 The comparatively modest role of the normative dimension earned him 
the criticism of complicity with mainstream writing.27 
The analytical and the normative dimensions are sometimes merged. In 
these cases, the normative goal decides on which insights are acceptable as an-
20 Peters, supra note 19, p. 545.
21 See for example the edited volume by Richard Falk, Balakrishnan Rajagopal & Jaqueline Stevens 
(eds.), International Law and the Third World: Reshaping Justice, Abingdon 2008.
22 Bhupinder S. Chimni, The Past, Present and Future of International Law: A Critical Third World 
Approach, 8 Melbourne Journal of International Law (2007), p. 499, 514.
23 Chimni, supra note 22, p. 514.
24 Hilary Charlesworth, Feminist Methods in International Law, 93:2 The American Journal of In-
ternational Law (1999), p. 379, 380.
25 Martti Koskenniemi, From Apology to Utopia: The Structure of International Legal Argument, 
Cambridge 2005, p. 548.
26 Koskenniemi, supra note 25, p. 555.
27 Anthony Carty, Liberalism’s ‘Dangerous Supplements’: Medieval Ghosts of International Law, 
13 Michigan Journal of International Law (1991), p. 161, 171.
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alytical findings and which are not. Such an ‘analysis’ evidently transgresses 
the scientific discourse as it immunizes itself against rational counter-argu-
ments. In some feminist and TWAIL literature, such fusions can be observed. 
The analytical project then becomes, as feminist author Hilary Charlesworth 
admits, ‘a political agenda rather than to strive to attain objective truth on a 
neutral basis’, it may then appear as ‘personal rather than detached’.28 A strength 
of critical literature – being the opposite of anemic scholarliness – here turns 
into a fundamental shortcoming. The two dimensions of critique, being a de-
scriptive and a normative project at the same time, are connected both with 
strengths and dilemmas. On the one hand, critical literature is a vital challenge 
to any technocratic denial of social responsibility. On the other hand, the close 
relationship between the analytical and the normative ambition can result in a 
precarious one-sidedness or even blindness concerning counter-arguments and 
aspects that do not fit into the picture. Some critical authors, thus, ultimately 
fall prey to the same criticism they formulate. 
C. CIL and CLS: More than an Offshot
The relationship between CIL and CLS needs some clarification. CLS is, first 
of all, the most important source of inspiration for CIL.29 It triggered a new era 
of critical literature on international law since the 1980s.30 It is important to 
note tough that NAIL, TWAIL and feminist approaches to international law can 
hardly be viewed as mere offshots of CLS. CIL is, to come back to the metaphor 
at the outset, rather the ‘half-sister’ of CLS. The relationship between CLS and 
CIL is more complex. There was critical literature on international law long 
before the rise of CLS. Socialist literature of the early 20th century on imperial-
ism is an example. Also TWAIL’s predecessor, the decolonization movement, 
was prominent already in the 1950s and 1960s and has early roots in the decol-
onization movement of the 19th century in Latin America and in even earlier 
epochs.31 Early TWAIL – now often called TWAIL I by contemporary TWAIL-
ers32 – received a strong boost and transformation through CLS. CLS-sensitiv-
28 Hilary Charlesworth, supra note 24, p. 380.
29 For an accessible survey of CLS thought see Roberto M. Unger, The Critical Legal Studies Move-
ment, 96 Harvard Law Review (1983), p. 561.
30 See, e.g. the criticism by Lea Brillmayer that Koskenniemi borrows from CLS reasoning wholesale 
and applies it ‘virtually without alteration to the international setting.’ See Lea Brillmayer, Book 
Review: From Apology to Utopia: The Structure of International Legal Argument, 85 The American 
Political Science Review (1991), p. 687, 687.
31 Chimni, supra note 22, pp. 500 ff.
32 Antony Anghie & Bhupinder S. Chimni, Third World Approaches to International Law and Indi-
vidual Responsibility in Internal Conflicts, 2 Chinese Journal of International Law (2003), p. 77, 79.
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ity for the functioning of the discourse led to new insights on how international 
law could remain an instrument of domination in the post-colonial era, long 
after the former colonies had gained independence. More than CLS, TWAIL 
focuses on the Third World. Analogous considerations apply to the relationship 
between feminist approaches and CLS. International feminism – the Women’s 
Rights Movement – had been on the rise since the mid-19th century.33 Already in 
1915, an International Congress of Women took place at the Hague with more 
than 1500 women participating.34 
Some CLS-ideas or topics are of particular importance for CIL. In the fol-
lowing, we outline three CLS ideas which significantly influenced CIL: the ‘in-
determinacy thesis’, the ‘contradiction thesis’, and the ‘social plasticity thesis’. 
CIL employed and adapted these ideas in various forms to the international 
sphere and international law. A thesis of strategic relevance for CIL is the clas-
sical CLS thesis concerning law’s indeterminacy. One of CLS’s main thrusts 
was to formulate a pitiless attack on any ‘naive’ belief in law’s objectivity and 
neutrality. CLS radically calls into question the distinction between ‘objective’ 
doctrinal work and ‘subjective’ political thought. Duncan Kennedy’s essay 
‘Form and Substance in Private Law Adjudication’ is the classical text.35 He 
claims that any legal argument is connected with underlying visions of soci-
ety – that doctrinal work is never merely a question of judicial logic. It is impos-
sible therefore to maintain a categorical distinction between legal and political 
thought.36 The argument is developed in the domestic context, but constitutes an 
invitation to international legal scholarship to explore whether similar consider-
ations apply to the international legal order. David Kennedy, Martti Kosken-
niemi and others spent much energy on showing that the indeterminacy thesis is 
valid in the international legal sphere, too, and maybe to an even higher degree. 
The second thesis is the ‘contradiction thesis’. At its core lies the claim is 
that the concept of ‘freedom’ is connected with a fundamental contradiction 
concerning the role of ‘the others’. The authoritative text is another essay by 
Duncan Kennedy entitled ‘The Structure of Blackstone’s Commentaries’.37 
Kennedy explains, in one of the most well-known CLS-passages, that the fun-
damental problem with freedom is that relations with others are both indispen-
33 Deborah Stienstra, Women’s Movements and International Organizations, New York 1994, 
pp. 47 ff.
34 Mary E. Hawkesworth, Globalization and Feminist Activism, Oxford 2006, p. 56.
35 Duncan Kennedy, Form and Substance in Private Law Adjudication, 89 Harvard Law Review 
(1976), p. 1685.
36 Kennedy, supra note 35, p. 1776.
37 Duncan Kennedy, The Structure of Blackstone’s Commentaries, 28 Buffalo Law Review (1979), 
p. 209.
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sable to freedom and incompatible with it.38 ‘The others’ are at the same time a 
prerequisite of freedom and a threat to it. What are the implications of this 
claim for international law? Most international lawyers imagine sovereignty as 
‘State freedom’39 and the ‘international’ society as composed of a large number 
of free, sovereign States.40 The ‘contradiction thesis’ raises the question whether 
the concept of sovereignty suffers from the same contradictions as the concept 
of freedom. If – according to the ‘contradiction thesis – the very idea of free-
dom is unclear, however, then the concept of sovereignty and its legal content 
may be challenged, too. 
The third thesis is the ‘social plasticity’-thesis. It concerns the options avail-
able for a society to shape its future. The main idea of the ‘social plasticity’ 
thesis is that we should widen the horizon of our imagination and become con-
scious of our intellectual routines if we want to make use of the full potential of 
rationality in our societies. The main references are two works by Roberto M. 
Unger in which he denounces thinking in ‘false necessities’.41 Unger argues 
that we should stop imagining the development and organization of societies in 
simplistic schemes or patterns, in predetermined stages. Such self-limitations 
are connected to what he calls our ‘formative context’, our intellectual back-
ground which determines on the patterns of our thought on conflict and conflict 
resolution. There are no ‘natural laws’ in the development of societies, there is 
social and organizational plasticity. Unger considers societies to be open to 
re-modeling in accordance with ‘real’ needs and demands. He emphasizes con-
tingency and urges to seize the opportunity to reshape the reality and the law. 
For critical international lawyers, Unger’s work is a call to reimagine the inter-
national society and international law’s role without taboos.42 Martti Kosken-
38 ‘[T]he goal of individual freedom is at the same time dependent on and incompatible with the com-
munal coercive action that is necessary to achieve it.’ See Kennedy, supra note 37, p. 211.
39 On this analogy see Koskenniemi, supra note 25. See also Karen Knop, Re/Statements: Feminism 
and State Sovereignty in International Law, 3 Transnational and Contemporary Legal Problems 
(1993), p. 293, arguing against the analogy by pointing to the diversity of groups within a State and 
the variety of functions a modern State has to perform. 
40 See Declaration on Principles of International Law concerning Friendly Relations and Co-operation 
among States in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations, GA Res. 2625 (XXV), 24 Oc-
tober 1970; UNYB 24 (1970) 788. 
41 Roberto M. Unger, Social Theory: Its Situation and its Task, Cambridge 1987; Roberto M. Un-
ger, False Necessity, London 2001 (new edition).
42 In the new edition of ‘False Necessity’ published in 2001, Unger describes the goal in the form of a 
question: ‘How can we make ourselves greater, individually and collectively, we who live in a rest-
less peace, after the slaughters and crusades, the catastrophes and the posturings, the illusions and 
the disillusionments, that filled the 20th century? How can we make ourselves greater, when an 
unforgiving skepticism has destroyed our inherited faiths?’  See Unger, supra note 41, p. XVII.
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niemi explicitly refers to the cited works.43 In a similar fashion, Karen Knop, a 
feminist CIL scholar, has called for the ‘real to be transformed by the imagina-
tion.44 
II. Critique At Work:  
How to Exercise Critique of International Law? 
The second part exposes how the critique of international law works. We begin 
by stating some key elements of the ‘critical toolkit’ and then address the cen-
tral topic of CIL, international law’s biases and some of the most influential 
claims in this field. Finally, we comment on the dilemmas connected with the 
normative question ‘resistance or reform?’.
A. Critical Toolkit:  
Language, Social Structures, and History
A key element of the ‘critical toolkit’ is the analysis of the relationship between 
language and law. CIL addresses the link between the operation of language and 
international law. It draws – as CLS – on important insights by structural lin-
guistics. Among the core ideas of structural linguistics is the claim that the 
whole (of the language) is more than its single components (the linguistic ex-
pressions). There exist ‘underlying structures’ which are crucial for the func-
tioning of the whole.45 The idea proved appealing to social and legal theory, and 
through CLS and CIL, it reached international legal scholarship. The subtitle of 
‘From Apology to Utopia’ is ‘The structure of international legal argument’ 
(our emphasis).46 David Kennedy published a book with the title ‘International 
Legal Structures’.47 In this work, Kennedy fleshes out ideas he developed in an 
essay written in 1980 (’Theses about international law discourse’). In the latter 
he said that his method can be called ‘structuralist’ because he seeks to explain 
the patterns of the international legal discourse.48 
43 Koskenniemi, supra note 25, p. 547.
44 Knop, supra note 39, p. 344.
45 De Saussure, Cours de linguistique générale, Paris 1916 (1979 reprint).
46 Koskenniemi calls his approach ‘deconstructive’: See Koskenniemi, supra note 25, p. 6. For a cri-
tique of this label for Koskenniemi see Nigel Purvis, Critical Legal Studies in Public International 
Law, 32 Harvard International Law Journal (1991), p. 81, 124.
47 David Kennedy, International Legal Structures, Baden-Baden 1987.
48 David Kennedy, Theses about International Law Discourse, 23 German Yearbook of International 
Law (1980), p. 353, 355.
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Structuralist search for underlying patterns is often combined with post-
structuralist ideas. It may be worth reminding that poststructuralism is not, as 
the notion might suggest, a counter-project to structuralism. Rather, it is a fur-
ther refinement and response to questions formulated by structuralism. Post-
structuralism does not challenge the structuralist idea that the whole is more 
than its single components. Its key topic is the relationship between the lan-
guage and the social world. It is interested in whether the language is something 
like a ‘mirror image’ of the real world or something different. It claims that 
linguistic expressions do not represent ‘real things’, language is not the ‘mirror 
image’ of reality.49 Linguistic expressions – including legal expressions – have 
no given meaning, no essence.50 They are connected with each other. Language 
is a ‘system of references’. The meaning of an expression is created – this is the 
crucial point – through linguistic practice.51 
Acceptance of poststructuralist ideas significantly impacts the international 
legal scholar’s research interests. The practices of the discourse become central. 
The focus is no longer on the single expression – the single legal term –, but 
shifts to the patterns of the discourse in general. The discourse creates meaning, 
social options and intellectual categories.52 The poststructuralist mindset proved 
appealing to CIL as it is sensitive for any form of use and abuse of power. It is 
open for the diversity of actors in the international sphere and their interplay. 
There is no artificial limitation of the perspective. Poststructuralism challenges 
a particularly important premise of traditional legal thinking. It questions that 
law-making and legal interpretation can be categorically distinguished. They 
are in the poststructuralist perspective just two practices in the legal discourse. 
This changes the perception of the role of States as ‘traditional’ lawmakers and 
of courts such as the ICJ as ‘adjudicative bodies’. The premise that law-making 
and interpretation are distinguishable constitutes a baseline in liberal legal 
thinking. The distinction hinges on the assumption that linguistic expressions 
have a more or less determinable core. The distinction only makes sense if this 
is the case. The poststructuralist view is incompatible with this premise. It con-
siders meaning not as something which can be found ‘in’ the text of a norm, but 
which is determined by the discourse, by something ‘outside’ the expression 
and the norm itself. The discourse decides on the meaning of the norm. In this 
49 Peter Brooker, Raman Selden & Peter Widdowson, A Reader’s Guide to Contemporary Literary 
Theory, Harlow 2005, p. 145.
50 Zsuzsa Baross, Poststructuralism, in: Irene R. Makaryk (ed.), Encyclopedia of Contemporary Li-
terary Theory: Approaches, Scholars, Terms, Toronto 2000, p. 158, 159.
51 Zsuzsa Baross, supra note 50, p. 159.
52 See, e.g. Diane Otto, Disconcerting ‘Masculinities’: Reinventing the Gendered Subject(s) of Inter-
national Human Rights Law, in: Doris Buss & Ambreena Manji (eds.), International Law: Modern 
Feminist Approaches, Portland 2005, p. 105.
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perspective both law-making and interpretation become mere discursive acts. 
The specificities of interpretation – and of the work of the judge in particular – 
can no longer be categorically distinguished from law-making. The single ex-
pression, the individual norm and its history are no longer at the center of the 
enquiry. Instead, discourse patterns that decide on the range of acceptable argu-
ments become crucial. The concentration on discourse pre-structures the per-
ception: As there are, in reality, always actors that influence the outcome of a 
discourse more than others, the meaning of law becomes a priori precarious 
and biased. The distinction between law and politics is necessarily blurred. 
Structuralism and poststructuralism change the perception of what international 
law is and how it operates, they suggest a subversive view of established institu-
tions. 
A second key element of the ‘critical’ toolkit can be labeled ‘analysis of in-
ternational social structures’. CIL deals with structures that create domination, 
e.g., political, economic, and cultural structures. Particular attention is paid to 
those that influence the legal discourse. In a poststructuralist world where 
norms have no fixed meanings, these structures decide on access to ‘conceptual 
commandeering’. ‘Conceptual commandeering’ means that one party is in a 
position to introduce new concepts into the discourse and to ultimately impose 
them on others. The rise of the concept of ‘global governance’ is a good exam-
ple. It was formulated by first world actors as if it were an expression of a natu-
ral and unchallengeable logic.53 Such concepts are connected with a set of ideas 
about the rational State, desired development, necessary rights etc. These ideas 
influence the way the social reality is shaped and works.54 Even if the concept 
of ‘global governance’ were not imposed on the Third World in a formal sense, 
it has become a sort of self-evident part of the international ‘legal realm’. As 
some TWAILers would put it: The idea of global governance forms part of the 
setting of neo-colonial dominance. The first world ‘dictates’ what ‘global gov-
ernance’ requires, while others are expected to accept that determination. 
A similar argument can be found in feminist scholarship. Feminists argue that 
the international legal discourse is controlled by males. This in turn is believed 
to lead to male conceptions of key notions, for example in the human rights 
53 Bhupinder S. Chimni, Third World Approaches to International Law: A Manifesto, 8 International 
Community Law Review (2006), p. 3, 15.
54 See, e.g. the formulation of ‘challenges’ for future TWAIL in: Ibironke T. Odumoso, Challenges for 
the (Present/)Future of Third World Approaches to International Law, 10 International Community 
Law Review (2008), p. 467.
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discourse where concepts such as ‘inhuman treatment’55 and ‘refugee’56 were 
originally tailored  – so the argument runs  – to the typical situation of men. 
These concepts are considered to have been adjusted to the situation of women 
only gradually. 
A third element of the ‘critical toolkit’ is history. CIL frequently engages 
history for a critical purpose. It has no ‘archivist’ agenda, it turns to history for 
the purpose of exercising critique of international law.57 History can help un-
mask false assumptions about the origin of legal norms, arguments or concep-
tions. TWAIL authors, for example, have engaged historical research to prove 
wrong the ‘Western’ narrative of the history of public international law as a 
history of progress.58 TWAIL tried to show that concepts such as sovereignty – 
to take a prominent example – are not ‘logical elaborations of a stable, philo-
sophically conceived sovereignty doctrine’, but should be conceived ‘as being 
generated by problems relating to colonial order.’59 In the view of TWAILers, it 
was not some abstract ideal about ‘law’ that inspired the concept of sovereignty, 
but the ambition to uphold existing patterns of domination.60 
B. Central Issue: International Law’s Biases
The central issue pursued in most of CIL-writing is international law’s biases. 
There exist two main versions of the bias-thesis: a substantive bias-thesis and a 
structural bias-thesis. The substantive bias-thesis claims that the international 
legal order, as it stands, produces unfair results. This criticism draws on the 
tradition of confronting ‘positive’ international law with an imagined ideal or-
der. It resembles a modern variant of the natural law discourse on international 
law. Two examples may illustrate this. The first one concerns international law’s 
formal conception of consent and equality. For example, critical authors reject 
the common understanding of equality and consent that allows ‘consensual’ 
55 Amy Farrell & Patrice McDermott, Claiming Afghan Women: The Challenge of Human Rights 
Discourse for Transnational Feminism, in: W. Herford & W. Kozol (eds.), Just Advocacy? Women’s 
Human Rights, Transnational Feminism, and the Politics of Representation, New Brunswick 2005, 
p. 33.
56 Jacqueline Greatbatch, The Gender Difference: Feminist Critiques of Refugee Discourse, 1 Inter-
national Journal of Refugee Law (1989), p. 518, 519–520.
57 Andreas L. Paulus, International Law After Postmodernism: Towards Renewal or Decline of Inter-
national Law?, 14 Leiden Journal of International Law (2001), p. 727, 738.
58 Obiora C. Okafor, Newness, Imperialism, and International Legal Reform in Our Time: A TWAIL 
Perspective, 43 Osgoode Hall Law Journal (2005), p. 171, 178.
59 Antony Anghie, Imperialism, Sovereignty and the Making of International Law, Cambridge 2008, 
pp. 6–7.
60 This view neglects the specific European context of the rise of the concept of sovereignty and its 
contribution to the pacification of the continent after the confessional schism. 
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transfer of toxic waste from Northern to Third World States.61 In their view, a 
proper understanding of equality among States would prohibit such self-de-
structive contracts.62 The second example relates to core ideas of international 
economic law. Critical authors argue that WTO rules on trade in services placed 
highly sensitive areas of domestic policy under the ‘banner of simple commer-
cial activity’, thereby depriving Third World States of important aspects of 
self-determination.63 Some argue that GATS is an imperialistic project, devised 
by the US and supported by the OECD.64 Substantive biases can be discovered 
in almost any field of international law.
The structural bias-thesis is more fundamental. It claims that international 
law is incapable of being objective and impartial. It categorically challenges the 
‘objectivist’ understanding of the law, i.e. the idea that the content of rules can 
be identified and applied without regard to factors such as personal world views 
of law-interpreters, their social roles, their experiences etc.65 The structural bi-
as-thesis concerns the very ability of international law to live up to the ambition 
of being a neutral order which most lawyers would consider to be implied in the 
notion of law. Some CIL-authors detect structural biases, e.g., in the too domi-
nant role of the legal discourse in the debate on international conflict resolution. 
They criticize – in the tradition of CLS ‘critique of rights’66 – the interplay be-
tween law and other forms of social conflict resolution and claim that legal 
conflict resolution typically prefers some outcomes over others. They attack the 
cultural hegemony of legal thinking. Some CIL authors consider the concentra-
tion on legal questions to be a key obstacle to dispute resolution as other forms 
of social interaction such as conversation and dialogue are constantly re-
pressed.67 
61 Laura A. Pratt, Decreasing Dirty Dumping? A Reevaluation of Toxic Waste Colonialism and the 
Global Management of Transboundary Hazardous Waste, 35 William & Mary Environmental Law 
& Policy Review (2011), p. 581.
62 Cyril Uchenna Gwam, Travaux Preparatoires of the Basel Convention on the Control of Trans-
boundary Movements of Hazardous Wastes and Their Disposal, 18 Journal of Natural Resources & 
Environmental Law (2003–2004) p. 1.
63 Mohsen Al Attar & Rebekah Thompson, How the Multi-Level Democratization of International 
Law-Making Can Effect Popular Aspirations towards Self-Determination, 3 Trade, Law & Develop-
ment (2011), p. 65, 77.
64 Claire Cutler, Toward a radical political economy critique of transnational economic law, in: 
Susan Marks (ed.), International Law on the Left, Cambridge 2008, p. 199.
65 Jan-R. Sieckmann, Objectivity of Law, in: IVR Encyclopedia, 2009, http://ivr-enc.info/index.php?-
title=Objectivity_of_Law (last accessed 11/10/13).
66 Duncan Kennedy, The Critique of Rights in Critical Legal Studies, in: Wendy Brown & Janet Hal-
ley (eds.), Left Legalism/Left Critique, Durham 2002, p. 178.
67 Charlesworth, supra note 24, p. 379.
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The most prominent accounts on structural biases in international law are 
provided by David Kennedy and Martti Koskenniemi. Already in 1980, Ken-
nedy wrote that the principles and rules of international law dissolve far too 
easily into ‘thin disguises for assertions of national interests’, and he attributed 
this problem to the manipulability of the basic norms around which the interna-
tional legal discourse is organized.68 Koskenniemi devotes a large part of ‘From 
Apology to Utopia’ to showing that the way international legal argument works 
is incompatible with the idea of an objective order. The ‘objectivist dream’ was, 
in his opinion, ‘faulted from the outset’.69 He attributes the failure to the very 
concept of law in the international sphere where two mutually exclusive catego-
ries of argument are acceptable: arguments referring to concrete social prac-
tices of international agents (’concrete’ arguments) and arguments reflecting 
considerations on justice (’normative’ arguments).70 Both categories are needed 
if one seeks to defend a legal argument against the criticism that it is merely 
utopian speculation or just apologetic of existing State practice. The fundamen-
tal problem is, according to Koskenniemi, that a norm cannot be concrete (fac-
tual) and normative (contra-factual) at a time. There is no ‘correct’ solution to 
legal problems, any international legal argument remains vulnerable to argu-
ments of the opposite category. David Kennedy formulates the dilemma as fol-
lows: ‘One may imagine law to be either critical of or grounded in State behav-
ior, and neither understanding is sufficient.’71 To provide an example: One may 
interpret the notion of ‘armed attack’ in Art. 51 of the UN Charter either by re-
ferring to State practice or by invoking a vision about the international legal 
community and the role of self-defense therein. Whatever position one adopts, 
though, it will always be possible to come up with an argument of the other 
category, leading to a regressus ad infinitum. 
The discussion of international law’s biases in critical international legal 
scholarship is ambiguous. On the one hand, it increases the sensitivity for inter-
national law’s blind spots. Feminist analysis, for example, influenced important 
developments in fields such as refugee law,72 gender-mainstreaming in interna-
tional organizational law,73 conflict resolution74 and international criminal law.75 
68 Kennedy, supra note 48, p. 359.
69 Koskenniemi, supra note 25, p. 515.
70 Koskenniemi, supra note 25, p. 58–69.
71 Kennedy, supra note 48, p. 383.
72 Alice Edwards, Transitioning Gender: Feminist Engagement with International Refugee Law and 
Policy, 29 Refugee Survey Quarterly (2010), p. 21.
73 Emilie Hafner-Burton & Mark A. Pollack, Mainstreaming Gender in Global Governance, 8 
European Journal of International Relations (2002), p. 339.
74 See in particular SC Res. 1325, 31 October 2000 concerning women, peace and security. 
75 See in particular SC Res. 1820, 19 June 2008 concerning sexual violence as a tool of war. 
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TWAIL has raised the sensitivity for direct and indirect patterns of post-colo-
nial domination of the Third World, and the Kennedy-Koskenniemi-argument 
exposed the fragility of legal arguments in the international sphere. On the other 
hand, doubts remain whether this criticism really fits the ‘big picture’. Are the 
biases as severe as described? What about the achievements of positive interna-
tional law, how are shortcomings and achievements to be balanced? What about 
the conflicts that did not take place because of international law? The critical 
perspective seems to be unconcerned with a more comprehensive picture which 
includes both the shortcomings and achievements of international law.76 
C. Positive International Law:  
Resistance or Reform or Both?
If acceptance of critical arguments is sought outside the community of critical 
legal scholars, the question arises to which degree a critical approach is pre-
pared to accommodate international law as it currently stands.77 The crucial 
question is: reform or resistance? Those who advocate mere reform risk being 
attacked for complicity with mainstream lawyers, those who favor ‘re-imagina-
tion’ of international law and resistance to the contemporary order risk their 
reputation as serious professionals. Reformism can be both, a strategy of realiz-
ing the possible or a contribution to the perpetuation of ‘wrong’ structures and 
solutions. Resistance can be both, too: a necessary strategy to trigger desired 
developments or an expression of self-satisfied ivory-tower blindness for the 
real world. The dilemma is inescapable. Some CIL authors seek to get around it 
by advocating reform and revolution which is contradictory as the two stances 
logically exclude each other.78 Makau Mutua, for example, writes that ‘the rad-
ical and reformist trends form a progressive whole that accounts for the com-
76 Koskenniemi’s second major work ‘The Gentle Civilizer of Nations’ (2002) can be seen as a reaction 
to his insight into this deficit of the critical perspective. See Koskenniemi, supra note 14.
77 Some feminist authors have addressed the problem of ’feminist soliloquy’. They deplore that femi-
nist authors often work in a ‘scholarly ghetto’ and that their contributions are rarely taken up by other 
members of the discipline. There is evidently some truth in the view that feminist perspectives have 
often been deliberately ignored by mainstream literature. However, feminist concentration on ins-
tances of ‘male’ power can lead to blindness for the real power structures and existing opportunities 
of women. Additionally, it may give rise to an attitude which confers the responsibility to change the 
situation only on others. For a thoughtful discussion of the topic see Hilary Charlesworth, Talk-
ing to Ourselves? Feminist Scholarship in International Law, in: Sari Kouvo and Zoe Pearson (eds.), 
Feminist Perspectives on Contemporary International Law, Oxford 2011, p. 17.
78 For TWAIL’s characteristic ‘double engagement’ with reform and resistance vis-à-vis international 
law see, e.g. Luis Eslava & Sundhya Pahuja, Between Resistance and Reform: TWAIL and the 
Universality of International Law, 3 Trade Law & Development (2011), p. 103. 
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plexity and diversity of TWAIL.79 This may sound reconciliatory, but it is hardly 
more than a semantic trick to veil the dilemma. 
Three main attitudes of CIL towards positive law can be distinguished. The 
boundaries between them are not rigid. The first can be described as ‘moderate 
reformism’. At the end of the day, a considerable part of CIL authors advocate 
modest reforms in international law. For example, feminist claims for gen-
der-mainstreaming in international economic institutions and dismantling of 
barriers to equal rights can be realized within the framework of current interna-
tional law.80 A second group of authors advocates intermediate positions. They 
radically criticize contemporary international law, but they recognize that – de-
spite all shortcomings – it provides important guarantees to the less powerful, 
such as human rights guarantees and the right to self-determination, that should 
not be put in danger. These authors are aware that there is something to lose, 
they warn of the ‘traps of nihilism’.81 TWAIL authors such as Bhupinder Chimni 
or Anthony Anghie belong to this group. Finally, there are the radical positions. 
TWAIL authors such as China Miéville or some radical feminist authors belong 
to this group. Some feminist positions, especially those inspired by Catherine 
MacKinnon’s work, advocate total rejection of positive law.82 These authors 
blame those taking more moderate positions for betraying the critical project. 
Such positions are often inspired by Marxism and its skepticism towards law in 
general. In this perspective, law is part of the ‘superstructure’ and ultimately 
determined by the economic base.83 The very existence of international law it-
self is an object of criticism, a cardinal suspect accused of serving just the aims 
of the powerful. Approaches relying on a Marxist conception of law are inher-
ently critical of the law as it currently stands.84 
79 Makau W. Mutua, What is TWAIL? American Society of International Law, Proceedings of the 
94th Annual Meeting (2000), p. 31, 32.
80 See Jacqui True, Mainstreaming Gender in Global Public Policy, 5 International Feminist Journal 
of Politics (2003), p. 368, raising the question whether feminist scholarship can afford not to engage 
with institutions of international power. 
81 Chimni, supra note 53, p. 26.
82 In this perspective, the problem is not just ‘male’ law, but law as such. Law itself is suspected of only 
reflecting and perpetuating power structures which obstruct meaningful discussions on the interna-
tional legal order. Anne Peters refers to a ‘double trap’ feminist jurists face: They have to struggle 
with the androcentricity of law and the ‘too high rank’ of law in the hierarchy of knowledge. See 
Anne Peters, Völkerrecht im Gender-Fokus, in: Andreas Zimmermann & Thomas Giegerich (eds.), 
Gender und Internationales Recht, Berlin 2007, p. 199.
83 Interestingly for our purpose, Marx himself never dealt with international law. See Martti Kosken-
niemi, What Should International Lawyers Learn from Karl Marx?, 17 Leiden Journal of Internatio-
nal Law (2004), p. 229.
84 See, e.g. China Miéville, Between Equal Rights: A Marxist Theory of International Law, Leiden 
2005.
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III. The Critical Heritage: What Should Remain?
In this part, we discuss three candidates for the role of enduring contributions of 
CIL to the discipline of international law. Our remarks are meant to be a subjec-
tive sketch of what should be considered the critical heritage. 
A. Doctrine: Making Doctrine Context Sensitive 
One of the lasting contributions of CIL to international legal theory is its call 
for context sensitive doctrinal work. Its insights about the structural bias-prob-
lem, but also those about the indeterminacy problem in general, make this claim 
an imperative for acceptable scientific legal work. Context sensitivity is the 
logical corollary of some unavoidable, basic features of international law. One 
may call it a ‘second-best’ solution, but it is a sincere answer to the indetermi-
nacy problem. Context sensitivity, as Koskenniemi observes, is more than prag-
matism, it is also not just a plea for an ‘anything goes’-morality.85 It is a claim 
to be conscious of the indeterminacy of law and of the relativity of our knowl-
edge. Doctrinal rigidity and dogmatism are incompatible with international 
law’s nature and structure. Doctrinal precision is essential, but it is not suffi-
cient. It is a central achievement of CIL to have shown why international law-
yers need to be open to insights of other disciplines such as sociology, psychol-
ogy, economics and historiography: It is because lawyers have to make use of 
the wide margins for acceptable legal solutions in the best informed way. CIL 
authors have shown at an unprecedented level that it is inadequate to treat the 
international legal discourse as a self-contained legal discourse.86 Due to CIL, it 
has become more difficult for international lawyers to ignore the question how 
they want to deal with the wide margins for possible, i.e. methodologically ac-
ceptable, legal arguments. In dealing with, e.g., problems of human rights, in-
ternational economic law or questions of statehood or extraterritoriality, inter-
national lawyers symptomatically face a number of diverse options. Many 
high-profile cases of international courts and tribunals could have turned out 
with a completely different outcome.87 The Kosovo Advisory Opinion of the 
ICJ or the Jurisdictional Immunities Case between Germany and Italy are good 
85 Koskenniemi, supra note 25, p. 536.
86 Koskenniemi describes the problem as follows: ‘For the judge, it must ultimately remain an incom-
prehensible dilemma and source of professional frustration […] why it is that equally competent 
lawyers, with equal amounts of professional integrity constantly come up with conflicting solutions 
to the same problems.’ See Koskenniemi, supra note 25, p. 551.
87 Martti Koskenniemi, International Law in a Post-Realist Era, 16 Australian Yearbook of Interna-
tional Law (1995), p. 1, 13.
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examples.88 Regarding the Kosovo Advisory Opinion, it is legitimate to argue 
that the ICJ should have given much more weight to the necessity to respect the 
sovereignty of existing States, and in the Immunities Case, it could have elabo-
rated more on the limits of state immunity under exceptional circumstances. 
The call for context sensitive doctrinal work is the response to the basic condi-
tions of international legal argument.
B. ‘Progressive’ Discourses: Ambivalences 
The second enduring contribution is CIL’s criticism of ‘progressive’ discourses. 
Skepticism towards any naïve understanding of progress in international law 
has been a central tenet of CIL ever since. CIL has the merit of having shown 
important ambivalences in discourses which are generally regarded as ‘progres-
sive’. 
The most important of these discourses concerns international human rights. 
The advancement of human rights is generally associated with increased val-
ue-orientation of international law, i.e. as ethical improvement, and it is there-
fore regarded as an ally of progress.89 However, as the criticism by CIL seeks to 
demonstrate, this view may be too optimistic. For example, freedom of religion 
can result in the protection of both acceptable and harmful behavior. It guaran-
tees respect for elemental religious needs, but can at the same time be used – as 
feminist legal authors have emphasized – for many forms of oppression, typi-
cally, but not exclusively, of women and children.90 Analogous considerations 
apply to the right to privacy. It provides both a cherished state-free sphere, 
which enables self-determination and retirement from the world.91 At the same 
time it may foster dominance over and oppression of weaker family members. 
Critical authors point to the ambiguity of concepts such as ‘family life’ or 
‘home’. They argue that it is precisely the positive connotation of such concepts 
88 Accordance with International Law of the Unilateral Declaration of Independence in Respect of 
Kosovo, Advisory Opinion, ICJ Reports (2010) 403; Jurisdictional Immunities of the State (Ger-
many v. Italy), Judgment, ICJ Reports (2012) 189.
89 See Tilmann Altwicker & Oliver Diggelmann, How is Progress Constructed in International 
Legal Theory?, European Journal of International Law (forthcoming 2014), arguing that ‘proving 
increased value-orientation’ of international law is a ‘technique’ to construct progress narratives.
90 See, e.g. Karima Bennoune, Secularism and Human Rights: A Contextual Analysis of Head-scarfs, 
Religious Expression, and Women’s Equality under International Law, 45 Columbia Journal of 
Transnational Law (2006–2007), p. 367; Susanne Baer, A Closer Look at Law: Human Rights as 
Multi-Level Sites of Struggles Over Multi-Dimensional Equality, 6 Utrecht Law Review (2010), 
p. 56, 65.
91 Oliver Diggelmann, Grundrechtsschutz der Privatheit, in: Veröffentlichungen der Vereinigung der 
Deutschen Staatsrechtslehrer (ed.), Der Schutzauftrag des Rechts, Berlin 2011, p. 50.
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which makes it difficult and sometimes impossible to effectively challenge op-
pressive structures. Some argue – in line with CLS ‘critique of rights’ – that the 
rigid focus on rights is often an obstacle to political action and cultural im-
provement.92 Observation of human rights is imperative; however, we should 
not expect to find the desired objective standpoint in a human rights perspec-
tive. The human rights perspective – so the crucial insight of CIL – is not a 
guarantee for ethically unequivocal results. 
A related ‘progressive’ discourse concerns ‘democracy and international 
law’. The dissemination of the democratic ideal tends to be associated with in-
creased value-orientation and therefore with progress, as well. The role of the 
discourse on democracy is more ambiguous though. On the one hand, there are 
strong reasons to believe that it contributes to a climate which fosters desirable 
changes in international relations. The claim that there is an ‘emerging right’ to 
democracy in international law is in principle in the interest of the poor and 
oppressed as it is, after all, a debate on the control of elites.93 On the other hand, 
CIL has pointed to a hidden and questionable agenda. Aspects of the internal 
organization of States become increasingly internationalized through the dis-
course on ‘democracy and international law’, but also through the sophistica-
tion of international human rights doctrine.94 Such questions are addressed in 
international political fora and, increasingly, in international judicial and expert 
bodies.95 Some TWAIL authors see a neo-colonial spirit at work.96
CIL’s rigorous scrutiny of ‘progressive’ discourses is likely to enduringly 
influence international legal scholarship. We mentioned only two of these dis-
courses, but there are others such as, e.g. the discourse on global constitutional-
ism or on the global rule of law. With CIL’s criticism in mind, it seems more 
92 Peters, supra note 82, pp. 265 ff.
93 Thomas M. Franck, The Emerging Right to Democratic Governance, 86 American Journal of Inter-
national Law (1992), p. 46.
94 For the contribution of human rights in designing and ‘harmonizing’ domestic organizational law, in 
the context of the European Convention on Human Rights, see Tilmann Altwicker, Convention 
Rights as Minimum Constitutional Guarantees? – The Conflict between Domestic Constitutional 
Law and the European Convention on Human Rights, in: Armin von Bogdandy & Pal Sonnvend 
(eds.), The European Constitutional Area and Constitutional Crisis in Europe, forthcoming 2014.
95 In few instances, the Security Council dealt with the internal organization of a state. In 1993, it 
addressed the internal situation of Haiti (SC Res. 841, 16 June 1993), and in 2011 it denounced at-
tempts to subvert the result of the election in the Ivory Coast when Laurent Gbagbo refused to leave 
office after the elections (SC Res. 1975, 30 March 2011). The essence of this development is that 
internal structures of States increasingly come under scrutiny and that they are measured with the 
yardstick of (Western) democracy. See also Venice Commission on Hungary’s new constitution 
(CDL-AD (2013) 012). 
96 See, famously, Bhupinder S. Chimni, supra note 53, p. 8, claiming that the internal structure of 
States is increasingly ‘under the scrutiny of international law’.
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difficult for States today to use them to cover hegemonic intentions.97 CIL is not 
opposing these discourses, of course. Rather, it is a critical observer that is 
highly sensitive to their abuse.
C. Lawyers and Their Law: Bringing Subjectivity Back In 
The last contribution of CIL that merits – in our view – preservation is CIL’s 
turn to subjectivity.98 It relates to the first (i.e. the claim for context sensitivity 
of legal doctrine), however it does not concern ‘the law’, but the person behind 
the law: CIL has the merit of having re-established the scientific interest in the 
international lawyer as a social agent. Fleshing out the consequences of the 
objectivity problem in international law, it rediscovers the international lawyer 
as a scientific object of study and calls for a modified identity.99 Outi Korhonen 
is right when she says that there are good reasons to re-examine the profession 
of international lawyers from the lawyer’s own perspective.100 Legal questions 
look different when you consider at them through the eyes of the professional 
lawyer, when the focus is on the lawyer’s objective and subjective constraints. 
CIL stresses the socially conditioned character of our knowledge and draws the 
interest to the lawyer’s knowledge, background and constraints.
Subjectivity poses a huge challenge for the international legal discourse. 
The notion of law is traditionally associated with objectivity and impartiality. 
Viewing the lawyer as an ‘engineer’ of social facts, driven by subjective factors, 
constitutes a provocation to a legal culture founded upon these two ideals. Nev-
ertheless, as CIL has set out, what international law ‘is’ cannot be explained 
entirely by reference to the object, ‘the law’, alone. We agree with CIL that the 
role of the ‘lawyer’, or, in general, the author of the single legal act and his 
background should be given more attention in international legal theory.101 
It seems essential for understanding how international law operates.
97 See, e.g, the criticism concerning the concept of a ‘responsibility to protect’ in Jessica Whyte, 
Human Rights: Confronting Governments? Michel Foucault and the Right to Intervene, in: Costas 
Douzinas, Matthew Stone & Illan Rua Wall (eds.), New Critical Legal Thinking: Law and the Poli-
tical, Abingdon 2012, p. 11.
98 Paulus, supra note 57, p. 739–743.
99 Koskenniemi, supra note 25, p. 548.
100 Outi Korhonen, International Lawyer: Towards Conceptualization of the Changing World and 
Practice, in Jens Ivar Drolshammer & Michael Pfeiffer (eds.), The Internationalization of the Prac-
tice of Law, The Hague 2001, p. 373.
101 This has recently been taken up by a number of scholars: See for example Antonio Cassese, Five 
Masters of International Law: Conversations with R.-J. Dupuy, E. Jiménez de Aréchaga, R. Jennings, 
L. Henkin and O. Schachter, Oxford 2011, p. 258 and the defense of Cassese’s approach as a proper 
part of “legal scholarship” in Peters, supra note 19.
Tilmann Altwicker & Oliver Diggelmann
Artikel / Article 90 SZIER/RSDIE 1/2014
IV. Conclusion: International Legal Theory  
in Post-Critical Times 
Current approaches to international legal theory do not seem to care much 
about the ‘critical heritage’ that we outlined above. Rather, they appear united 
in their distance to CIL.102 Contemporary approaches such as ‘new formalism’ 
or ‘global constitutionalism’ can properly be considered as a reaction or coun-
ter-models to CIL. Other approaches, like ‘global legal pluralism’, appear in 
some sense as a sort of reaction to CIL insights into the relativity of knowledge 
about law. In the following, we briefly sketch why we think that contemporary 
approaches underestimate the ‘critical heritage’. 
An approach that seems to gain currency is ‘new formalism’.103 In its core it 
is an attempt to install a new theory-based positivism that has to be distin-
guished from unreflected ‘mainstream positivism’ which is categorically skep-
tical of ‘theory’. Proponents of ‘new formalism’ try to re-establish the old 
boundaries between law and non-law that have been under attack from critical 
legal scholarship. The aim is to bring order into a complex international legal 
world. For that purpose, ‘new formalism’ employs a strictly defined concept of 
international law, mainly with the help of established authorities of positivism 
such as Hans Kelsen and H.L.A. Hart.104 Formalist authors criticize, i.a. the role 
of academic lawyers in the process of law-making. There is in their view an 
undue change of roles between academic lawyers and lawmakers.105 They advo-
cate doctrinal precision and a specific, formalistic consciousness of methodol-
ogy as a solution. In our view, new formalism’s main shortcoming is the way it 
treats the determinacy-problem. Kammerhofer, for example, writes that inter-
national law is not ‘categorically more uncertain than any other legal system’.106 
‘New formalism’ seems to be guided more by an ideal of how a legal system 
102 Bardo Fassbender, Optimismus und Skepsis im Völkerrechtdenken der Gegenwart, 65 Die Öffent-
liche Verwaltung (2012), p. 41, 46; Antony Carty, Critical International Law: Recent Trends in the 
Theory of International Law, 2 European Journal of International Law (1991), p. 1.
103 Jean D’Aspremont, Formalism and the Sources of International Law, Oxford 2011; Jörg Kammer-
hofer, The Benefits of the Pure Theory of Law for the International Lawyer, 12 International Legal 
Theory (2012), p. 5.
104 On the contribution of legal positivism to international legal theory (with a focus on Kelsen and 
Hart) see Tilmann Altwicker, Völkerrecht und Rechtspositivismus – Eine Annäherung mit Kelsen 
und Hart, 10 Zeitschrift für Rechtsphilosophie (2012), p. 46. 
105 See Jörg Kammerhofer, Law-Making by Scholarship? The Dark Side of 21st Century International 
Law “Methodology”, in James Crawford & Sarah Nouwen (eds.), 3 Selected Proceedings of the 
European Society of International Law (2012), p. 115; for criticism see Peters, supra note 19.
106 Jörg Kammerhofer, Uncertainty in International Law, Abingdon 2011, p. 2.
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should work and less interested in the specificities of the law of the often ‘anar-
chical’ international society, to borrow from Hedley Bull.
Another prominent contemporary approach is global constitutionalism.107 
The question whether there is international constitutional law or not has stimu-
lated a lively debate in international legal scholarship over the past fifteen years. 
Global constitutionalism is, in its core, a decidedly law-centered debate that 
seeks conceptual and legal stability in the global political constellation after the 
end of the Cold War. The idea of hierarchical global law – global law as a con-
straint to both lower-ranking international law and domestic law – is expected 
to provide the basis for further international integration and to forge an interna-
tional community based on shared ‘constitutional’ values. From a CIL perspec-
tive, global constitutionalism is likely to fall prey to the ambivalences of ‘pro-
gressive’ discourses. The debate is connected to a number of discourses, such as 
the one on human rights, on an international rule of law, and on international 
law and democracy. It is difficult to see how CIL’s insights into the ambiva-
lences of ‘progressive’ discourses could be reflected in the debate, not to forget 
that ‘constitutionalism’ is itself a ‘progressive’ discourse.108 The debate tends to 
immunize itself against critical questions. It perceives the international realm 
through a constitutionalist lens. It re-labels what it sees in a constitutionalist 
language. The dominance of law and of legal thinking in the constitutionalist 
world view shadows basic problems of international law’s ambiguities and inde-
terminacy.
The last strand to be addressed is ‘global legal pluralism’. It, too, currently 
receives a lot of scholarly attention,109 which seems at least partly due to the 
positive connotation of its key notion ‘pluralism’. The aim is to better under-
stand the heterogeneous international legal realm and to develop a plausible 
answer to this heterogeneity.110 The core idea is: The ‘plurality’ of legal orders 
107 A good survey of the debate is provided by the collection of articles in vol. II of 16 Indiana Journal 
of Global Legal Studies (2009). For a seminal text: Bardo Fassbender, The United Nations Charter 
as Constitution of the International Community, 36 Columbia Journal of Transnational Law (1998), 
p. 529. For the merits of the debate in particular: Anne Peters, The Merits of Global Constitutiona-
lism, 16 Indiana Journal of Global Legal Studies (2009), p. 397. For a critical analysis of the debate: 
Oliver Diggelmann & Tilmann Altwicker, Is There Something like a Constitution of Internatio-
nal Law? A Critical Analysis of the Debate on World Constitutionalism, 68 Heidelberg Journal of 
International Law (2008), p. 623.
108 Ulrich Klaus Preuss, Constitutional Revolution: The Link between Constitutionalism and Pro-
gress, Amherst 1995.
109 Mireille Delmas-Marty, Ordering Pluralism, Oxford 2009; Nico Krisch, Beyond Constitutiona-
lism: The Pluralist Structure of Postnational Law, Oxford 2010; Paul Schiff Berman, Global Legal 
Pluralism, Cambridge 2012. 
110 Gregory Shaffer, International Law and Global Public Goods in a Legal Pluralist World, 
23  European Journal of International Law (2012), p. 669, 671. 
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should be overcome in favor of a ‘pluralist’ ordering. Pluralists advocate a shift 
from separateness of orders to ordered diversity without a gravitational center 
or hierarchy.111 While ‘global constitutionalism’ borrows from public law prin-
ciples, ‘global legal pluralism’ relies on organizational ideas which were devel-
oped in international private law and with respect to transnational markets.112 
It focuses on interactions between legal systems. The approach is an attempt to 
formulate a positive vision of the international legal realm which does not ig-
nore the skepticism towards universal values and the persisting debate on frag-
mentation.113 From a CIL perspective, one notes that the concept of ‘diversity’ 
is largely consonant with CIL ideas. It implies, e.g., sensitivity concerning the 
ambivalent roles of ‘progessive’ discourses and the insights into the necessity to 
take the context of legal questions into account. However, CIL-authors would 
ask about the consequences of the decision to make ‘diversity’ the strategic no-
tion of the approach. Who benefits from a ‘diversity’ approach to international 
law? Who loses? Who decides on what ‘diversity’ means and excludes? 
All three current approaches in international legal theory strive for a theo-
ry-informed positive vision of international law. They aspire to be perceived as 
constructive alternatives to the ‘negativism’ generally associated with CIL. In 
our view, they discard CIL’s insights too easily. In our view, future ‘theorists’ of 
international law may be well-advised to take a fresh and unbiased look at the 
potential encapsulated in CIL and its project of ‘critique’ of international law. 
‘Critique’ and ‘being critical’ is not merely about asking uneasy questions or 
challenging doctrinal positions. ‘Critique’, rightly understood, is about persis-
tently asking foundational questions, such as: ‘Under which conditions is inter-
national law truly universal?’ or ‘Under which conditions is international law 
really “law”?’ In our view, despite all shortcomings and exaggerations one 
might find in CIL-literature, we need more, not less, critical theories of interna-
tional law.
111 Shaffer, supra note 110, p. 671.
112 Shaffer, supra note 110, p. 671.
113 Krisch, supra note 109.
